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INTRODUCTION
In the year 1960, assume that a contract is executed in New York
between Buyer, a resident of Florida, and Seller, a resident of New York.
The contract calls for the settlement of all disputes arising thereunder
1y arbitration, the arbitral proceedings to be held in New York under
the New York Arbitration Statute. The agreement further provides that
the parties are to abide by the rules of Seller's trade association.
A dispute arises and Seller seeks to settle it by arbitration. Seller
communicates his intentions to Buyer, who, having been a businessman
for many years, takes the rather cynical approach that: contracts are
made to be broken; arbitration is a device solely designed to cheat him
out of his just due by denying him his day in court; and, the rules of
Seller's association are not binding on him since in addition to his not
being a member, lie has never seen a copy of its rules. Buyer also knew
that he owned no property in New York, and that he was not licensed
to, nor did lie do any business in New York. It therefore was obvious
to him that the only place Seller successfully could assert his claim for
*Member of the Florida Bar.
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alleged breach of contract was in Florida. Based on all of this "misinforma-
tion," Buyer concluded that he could safely ignore Seller's notices.
Imagine Buyer's surprise when Seller eventually filed suit in Florida
based on a default judgment rendered by the New York Supreme Court,
confirming an ex parte arbitration award in favor of Seller. It is a fairly
safe assumption that Buyer's attorney will lose no time in pointing out
to the Florida court the alleged defects upon which the New York
Court erroneously based its jurisdiction over Buyer's person. The concluding
factor that will appear to determine who shall prevail in Seller's Florida
action will be couched in terms of whether full faith and credit should
or should not be accorded the New York judgment. However, such a
"conclusion" can be reached only after Florida has made intelligent inquiry
concerning New York's exercise of in personam jurisdiction over Buyer.
When viewed from this approach it becomes apparent that the critical
area as to the enforceability of a sister state's judgment is not whether
full faith and credit per se must be given, but rather whether any of the
alleged jurisdictional defects were sufficient to make the New York
judgment a nullity.
The foregoing fact picture is designed to give a fleeting impression
of some of the circumstances that could be presented in a Florida action
on a sister state judgment. The hypothet, although somewhat typical, falls
quite short of encompassing the many factual issues that are raised by
the cases dealing with sister state enforcement. Its purpose is primarily
one of orientation to provide a point of departure for further discussion.
The first part of this article will deal with the general rules relating
to the full faith and credit that must be accorded a sister state judgment
based on an ex parte arbitration award. The second part of the article
will be devoted to an examination of those jurisdictional defects which
are bred most frequently by an ex parte arbitration, wherein the defaulting
party allegedly has consented to a sister state's jurisdiction.
I. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
A. General Rule
A judgment entered on an arbitral award is a judgment on the merits1
and is entitled to full faith and credit.2 This general rule is applicable,
as is the case with most rules of law, only in light of the qualifications
1. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908); United States Plywood Corp. v.
Hudson Lumber Co., 127 F. Supp. 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Merritt-Chapman & Scott
Corp. v. State Road Dept., 98 So.2d 85 (Fla. 1957); Springs Cotton Mills v. Buster
Boy Suit Co., 88 N.Y.S.2d 295 (App. Div.), aff'd, 300 N.Y. 586, 89 N.E.2d 877
(1949); E. Arthur Tutein, Inc. v. Htdson Valley Coke & Products Corp., 245 N.Y.Supp.
125 (App. Div. 1930), afj'd, 256 N.Y. 530, 177 N.E. 127 (1931); STURGES, COM-
MERCIAL ARBRITRATION AND AWARDS 932 (1930).
2. "Full Faith and Credit shall .be given in each State to the public Acts, Records,
and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws
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and exceptions that surround it. The first and most important exception
is that only those judgments rendered by courts of competent jurisdiction
are entitled to full faith and credit.3 When a defendant has never had
his day in court with respect to jurisdiction, the above qualification permits
him to relitigate the rendering court's jurisdiction over the parties and
the subject matter.4
A court's jurisdiction over the person, and subsequent attempts to
litigate that issue, presents one of the greatest drawbacks to the growth
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and
the Effect thereof." U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 1.
Congress has prescribed the credit to be given by providing that such acts, records,
and judicial proceedings must be given "the same full faith and credit ... as they have
by law or usage in the courts of such State ...from which they are taken." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738 (1958).
For cases illustrating the general rule stated in the text see: Kentucky River Mills
v. Jackson, 206 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1953); Pan Am. Foods Co. v. Lester Lawrence &
Son, Inc.,. 147 F. Supp. 113 (N.D. Ill. 1956) (enforced in a jurisdiction lacking a
modern arbitration statute); United States Plywood Corp. v. Hudson Lumber Co., 127
F. Supp. 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Hirsch Fabrics Corp. v. Southern Athletic Co., 98 F.
Supp. 436 (E.D. Tenn. 1951) (enforced in a jurisdiction lacking a modem arbitration
statute); Ripley Fabrics Corp. v. Hymen, 91 F. Supp. 1007 (N.D. 11. 1950) (enforced
in a jurisdiction lacking a modern arbitration statute); Marvelo Fabrics, Inc. v. Jaris, 87
F. Supp. 245 (W.D. Mo. 1949) (enforced in a jurisdiction lacking a modem arbitration
statute); Mulcahy v. Whitehill, 48 F. Supp. 917 (D. Mass. 1943); Pacific Mills v. Hillman
Garment, Inc., 87 So.2d 599 (Fla. 1956) (enforced in a jurisdiction which at the time
lacked a modem arbitration statute); Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v. Hymen, 341 II1. App. 396,
94 N.E.2d 93 (1950) (enforced in a jurisdiction lacking a modem arbitration statute);
Catz Am. Co. v. Westco Products, 8 ARB. J. (n.s.) 209 (Los Angeles Munic. Ct. 1953);
Wemwag v. Pawling, 5 Gill. & J. 500, 25 Am. Dec. 317 (Md. 1833) (enforced in a
jurisdiction lacking a modem arbitration statute); Samincorp So. Am. Minerals & Mer-
chandise Corp. v. Lewis, 337 Mass. 298, 149 N.E.2d 385 (1958); Cohen & Sons v.
Thompson & Starr, 4 ARB. J. (n.s.) 307 (Ore. 1949). See also Milliken v. Meyer, 311
U.S. 457 (1940); Rothschild & Co. v. Marshall, 44 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1930); In re
Norris' Estate, 78 Cal. App.2d 152, 177 P.2d 299 (1947).
This article examines foreign judgments in the interstate context. See Bata v. Hill,
139 A.2d 159 (Del. Ch. 1958), where the court classified foreign judgments as inter-
national and interstate. However, it should be noted that although the concept of full
faith and credit is inapplicable to foreign awards rendered abroad against a party resident
in the United States and international judgments confirming them, the New York courts,
in the absence of any constitutional compulsion, have upheld them as illustrated in the
leading cases of Gilbert v. Burnstine, 255 N.Y. 348, 174 N.E. 706 (1931), and Sargant
v. Monroe, 49 N.Y.S.2d 546 (App. Div. 1944). Both these cases followed the American
conflict of laws view that validity depends on the observance of the law of the place
where the award or judgment was rendered. RESTATEMENTr, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 450(1)
(1934 See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Thompson v. Whitman, 85
U.S. (18 Wall.) 457 (1873); D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165 (1850).
4. Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 525 (1931);
McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917); Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining
& Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111 (1912); Wetmore v. Karrick, 205 U.S. 141 (1907); Hart
v. Sansom, 110 U.S. 151 (1884); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Thompson
v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457 (1873). But see Chicot County Drainage Dist.
v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940); Trienies v. Sunshine Mining Co,, 308 U.S.
66, 78, n.26 (1939), discussing an implied finding of jurisdiction by the rendering
court, thus making the jurisdictional issues res judicata.
For some excellent articles discussing the issue of full faith and credit and jurisdiction
see, Reese & Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 COLUM. L.
REV. 153, 176 (1949); Rashid, The Full Faith and Credit Clause: Collateral Attack
of Jurisdictional Issues, 36 GEO. L.I. 154 (1948); Cheatham, Res Tudicata and the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, 44 COLUM. L. REV. 330. 351 (1944); Boskey & Braucher, Juris-
diction and Collateral Attack: October Term, 1939, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 1006 (1940);
Medina, Conclusiveness of Rulings on jurisdiction, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 238 (1931).
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of interstate arbitration. This is particularly true in situations like the one
posed in the introductory hypothet, namely, where a default judgment is
rendered against a nonresident defendant who never made an appearance,
which judgment the plaintiff now seeks to enforce in the state where
defendant resides. In the absence of an appearance by the defendant, neither
the doctrines of res judicata nor estoppel by judgment become operative
to foreclose the question of jurisdiction.5 Therefore, the forum is completely
free to inquire into the jurisdiction of the rendering court, and if it is
found lacking, the judgment will be declared a nullity.
Florida is the only state that legislatively has expressed a policy
favorable to the enforcement of award confirming judgments, both sister
state and foreign, by providing for their expeditious enforcement through
the use of motion practice.6 Section 57.27(2) of the recently enacted
Florida Arbitration Code provides:
Any judgment entered upon an award by a court of competent
jurisdiction of any state, territory, the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico or foreign country shall be enforceable by application as
provided in § 57.26 and regardless of the time when such award
may have been made. (Emphasis added.) 7
The above section, although it establishes a climate favorable to enforce-
ment, is persuasive but certainly :not conclusive insofar as the jurisdiction
of the rendering court over the defendant's person and the subject matter
is concerned. The question of "competent jurisdiction" is still open
to attack.8
B. Choice of Law
Another facet of full faith and credit is the choice of law governing
the validity of the judgment sought to be enforced. The question of
choice of law for purposes of full faith and credit is to be distinguished
from the problem of whether arbitration should be characterized as
substantive or procedural for purposes of enforcing the arbitration agreement,
an area beyond the scope of this article.9 The general authority is to
5. See cases cited note 4 supra. See also Harris v. East India Trading Co., 144
N.Y.S.2d 894 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (participation in selection of the arbitrators, or in any
of the proceedings, estops the raising of the jurisdictional issue as to the making of
the contract providing for arbitration).
6. Section 57.26 of the Florida Arbitration Code provides:
[Ain application to the court under this law shall be by motion and shall
be heard in the manner and upon the notice provided by law or rule of
court for the making and hearing of motions. FLA. STAT. § 57.26 (1959).
7. FLA. STAT. § 57.27(2) (1959).
8. See note 3 supra.
9. E.g., Moyer v. Van-Dye-Way Corp., 126 F.2d 339, 341 (3d Cir. 1942); 2
BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 347.6 (1935); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws §
450(1) (1934). For articles dealing with choice of law generally see, Wientraub, Due
Process and Full Faith and Credit Limitations on State's Choice of Law, 44 IowA L.
REv. 449 (1959); Reese, Full Faith and Credit to Statutes: The Defense of Public Policy,
19 U. CHI. L. REv. 339 (1952); Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52
COLUM. L. REv. 959 (1952).
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the effect that the validity of an arbitration award and judgments rendered
thereon is determined by the law of the state of rendition. 10 There is,
however, no constitutional compulsion under the full faith and credit
clause which requires a forum to follow this rule. Notwithstanding the
lack of constitutional compulsion, the rule governing validity in a judgment
enforcement context would seem to be fairly well settled.
Although further discussion on this point would appear unnecessary,
certain disturbing language in several recent Florida decisions make this
writer wonder whether these opinions might serve as a basis for turning
this so-called settled area into a boiling controversy.
In Pacific Mills v. Hillman Garment, Inc.," a complaint alleging an
arbitration proceeding conducted according to the provisions of the New
York Arbitration Act;12 participation by the defendant; and a judgment
confirming an award in favor of plaintiff, was held to have stated a cause
of action. Although the Florida Supreme Court took judicial notice 13 of
the default provisions of the New York Act,14 its evaluation thereof entailed
an admixture of New York and Florida law, with the latter definitely
predominating. The following excerpts from the opinion illustrate the
evaluative process used to determine the validity of the New York judgment.
We are next confronted with the question as to whether these
provisions of the New York Civil Practice Act so comport with
our notions of due process as to accord to the New York judgment
full faith and credit. . . . (Emphasis added.)' 5
Our traditional ideals of fair play and substantial justice demand
that when a person is -sued, he should have notice of the suit
and an opportunity to defend. (Emphasis added.) 16
The unique methods utilized to determine the validity of a sister state
judgment in the Hillman case, unfortunately, have not gone unnoticed.
In Futterman v. Gerber,'7 the specially concurring opinion, based on the
10. These problems have been particularly acute in the federal courts where the
rule of Eric v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), has been playing havoc. See, e.g., Bern-
hardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956) (arbitration substantive for purposes of
Erie); Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959),
cert. granted, 362 U.S. 909 (1960) (United States Arbitration Act applicable in diversity
cases where agreement qualifies Linder the act); Miller v. American Ins. Co. of Newark,
N.J., 124 F. Supp. 160 (W.D. Ark. 1954) (motion to stay suit on Texas insurance
contract, executed in Texas to Texas resident, granted holding that Arkansas law of
revocability would not control unless the Texas law of irrevocability "offended a strong
public policy of the forum").
11. 87 So.2d 599 (Fla. 1956).
12. N.Y. CIv. PRAc. ACT art. 84.
13. In Florida, the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act, FLA. STAT. §
92.031 (1959), requires the party to plead the foreign law that he intends to rely
upon in order to secure the benefits of such law. See Kingston v. Quimby, 80 So.2d 455
(Fla. 1955) (strictly construing the statute); Stem, Florida Conflict of Laws, 10 MIAMI
L.Q. 260 (1956); Stem, Florida Conflict of Laws, 8 MIAMI L.Q. 209 (1954).
14. N.Y. CIv. PRAc. ACT § 1450. See text accompanying note 32 infra.
15. Pacific Mills v. Hillman Garment, Inc., 87 So.2d 599, 602 (Fla. 1956).
16. Id. at 602.
17. 109 So.2d 575 (Fla. App. 1959).
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authority of Hillman, contended that "it was incumbent upon the trial
judge to determine whether the manner employed to effect service of
process . . . comports with our notions of due process." (Emphasis added.)
After comparing the Illinois statute that was used as a standard in Hillman,
it was found to be "agreeable to our traditional ideals of fair play and
substantial justice. . .. "Is
If the comparisons made with Florida statutes are solely for the
purpose of achieving a better understanding as to how the sister states
have implemented their statutes, then they are harmless ones. However, if
Florida statutes are to be set up as standards to which sister state practices
are to be compared, harmless enlightenment has been perverted to permit
an evaluation of validity under the law of Florida. 19 This latter type
determination directly contravenes the prevailing conflict of laws rule
that the validity of a sister state's judgment is determined by the law of the
state of rendition. 20 Under the "newly reinvigorated full faith and credit
18. Id. at 576 (Emphasis added). In Pacific Mills v. Hillman Garment, Inc., 87
So.2d 599, 603, the following comparison was made:
Our own state has enacted analogous statutes ....
We cannot in principle distinguish between an Act that provides that a
party subjects himself to the jurisdiction of the courts of a particular state
when he voluntarily sets in motion a quasi-judicial proceeding that might
ultimately lead to a judgment as a part of the same proceeding under the
laws of that state and a statute which by its own force subjects a non-
resident to a form of substituted service in a state by engaging in business
in that state. (Emphasis added.)
19. The type of thinking which results in deviations from the general rule concerning
the law governing the validity of a sister state judgment is not without precedent in
Florida. The applicability of the doctrine of res judicata received a severe jolt when the
Supreme Court of Florida refused to give full faith and credit to a sister state judgment.
This peculiar result obtained in Mabson v. Mabson, 104 Fla. 162, 169, 140 So. 801,
803-4 (1932), a decision which is apparently still good law in Florida. A decree of
divorce was granted to the husband, in Florida, based on constructive service. The wife,
in New York at the time, instituted a suit against her husband, based on personal
service, for separate maintenance and support. The New York court dismissed the wife's
action on the ground that at the time her suit was instituted, the matrimonial domicile
of the parties was in Florida, and not in New York. This finding was based on the fact
that the Florida court had so held by granting a final decree of divorce to the husband.
The wife then brought a bill in the nature of a bill of review to invalidate the Florida
decree. The husband set up the New York proceedings as being res judicata on the issue
of the Florida court's jurisdiction, this question having been fully litigated in New York.
In reversing the lower court's dismissal of the wife's bill, the court held that:
The right of a Florida Court to determine whether or not its jurisdiction
has been properly invoked and exercised, cannot be barred by what has
been determined by the courts of any other state. The courts of this state
retain at all times jurisdiction to entertain a bill or other proceeding making
a direct attack upon the validity of decrees rendered here, so whatever
may have been decided in some state in a collateral proceeding,
whether between the same parties or not, would constitute no bar to a
proceeding in the courts of this state in which the courts of this state are
called upon to determine for themselves their own jurisdiction and the
regularity of their own judgments.
20. Another example of when doubt was cast upon the language of the Restatement
was in the case of Newport News Shipping & Drydock Co. v. Seaboard Maritime Corp.,
174 F. Supp. 466, 469 n.17 (D. Del. 1958). The court raised, but did not decide, the
apparent conflict between the RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 450, comment d
(1934),
The law of a state where a valid judgment is rendered determines who are
in privity with the parties to the judgment. If by the law of a state, privity
1960]
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clause" 21 and the announced public policy of the forum,22 such thinking
has no place in the opinions of the Florida courts.
11. ACQUISITION OF JURISDICTION OVER A DEFAULTING NON-RESIDENT
It is to be noted at the very outset that the agreement to arbitrate is
the sole referent from which a court can acquire jurisdiction over a
nonappearing party. The rendering court's power depends on the existence
and terms of such an agreement. To place in proper perspective the
judicial and legislative technicalities and ambiguities which sometimes cloud
the issues, it is necessary to realize that they play a role which is subservient
to that played by the agreement. Their only proper function is to facilitate
the court's determination of whether or not the agreement to arbitrate
confers jurisdiction over the parties. 23
Factually, the scope of this section is limited to situations where there
has been an alleged consent to jurisdiction followed by an ex parte
proceeding. Such jurisdictional facts as the making of the agreement to
arbitrate, consent and notice are the issues to be resolved.
"The large stream of commerce and industry which is generated in
or flows through New York" 24 has made it the center of arbitration in
is imposed upon persons over whom the state has no jurisdiction, the judg-
ment is to that extent invalid.
and the decision in Bigelow v. Old Dominion Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111
(1912), when it noted that "The penultimate sentence of § 450d causes the court some
concern; for if a judgment of a court cannot be binding on persons outside the jurisdiction
of the state, it would seem violative of procedural due process for a foreign forum to
accord greater efficacy to a decree than the adjudicating court."
The Court in Bigelow v. Old Dominion 'Mining & Smelting Co., supra at 139,
stated that:
[lilt is clear that the conclusive effect of a judgment in personam which
is recognized when questioned in the courts of another state depends upon
whether it is the judgment of a court which had jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant sought to be bound. The estoppel here insisted upon is
grounded not upon actual notice or appearance, but upon a theory as to
the relation between joint tort-feasors under the laws of New York. If the
Massachusetts court was of the opinion that under the general law that
relationship was not such as to make Bigelow a party by either privity or
representation, it was under no obligation to treat the New York judgment
as a bar to the suit in which it was pleaded. (Emphasis added.)
21. Stem, The Conflict of Laws in Commercial Arbitration, 17 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 567, 575 (1952).
22. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
23. The outlook of Chief Judge Cardozo which enabled him to resolve these
recurring technicalities and ambiguities was succintly stated in Finsilver, Still & Moss
v. Goldberg, Maas & Co., 253 N.Y. 382, 392, 171 N.E. 579, 582 (1930):
The task of judicial construction would be easier if statutes were invariably
drafted with unity of plan and precision of expression. Indeed, adherence
to the same standards would be useful also in opinions. The ideal being
unattainable, we must not exaggerate the significance of deviations from
the perfect norm. (Emphasis added.)
24. Weiss, The Arbitration Award and the Non-Resident: Nuance in New York,
48 COLUM. L. REv. 366 n.4 (1948), one of the leading articles on the jurisdictional
problems of non-residence. For other articles concerning the enforcement of arbitral
awards and judgments rendered thereon see. Heilman, Enforceabality of Foreign Awards,
3 ARB. J. (n.s.) 183 (1939); Heilman, Arbitration Agreements and the Conflict of Laws,
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the United States. As a result of its dominant position, the majority of
cases dealing with the question of full faith and credit have involved
award confirming judgments rendered by New York courts. It thus will
become necessary to pay particular attention to the statutory and decisional
law of New York dealing with the acquisition of in personam jurisdiction
by its courts.
A. Contractual Consent as a Basis for Jurisdiction
It is well settled that parties by contractual consent can confer juris-
diction over their person.2 5 The verbalization of such an intent is limited
only by the imagination of the parties, and the ingenuity of the courts
in apprehending their objectives. Some of the more commonly used forms
are: (1) an express provision in the "container" contract 26 designating a
particular jurisdiction2 7 or alternative jurisdictions2 as the situs for arbitra-
tion, usually coupled with a clause stipulating that the arbitration statute
of the selected situs shall govern the proceeding;29 (2) a provision in
the "container" contract incorporating by reference30 either the rles of the
American Arbitration Association or the arbitration rules of some trade
association." 1
38 YALE L.J. 617 (1929); Jones, Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 31 So. Cal. L. REv.
1 (1957); Jones, Three Centuries of Commercial Arbitration in New York, 1956 WASH.
U.L.Q. 193; Lorenzen, Commercial Arbitration -Enforcement of Foreign Award, 45
YALE L.J. 39 (1935); Lorenzen, Commercial Arbitration -International and Interstate
43 YALE L.J. 716 (1934); Popkin & Jacobson, Jurisdiction Over the Non-Resident in
Arbitration Proceedings, 17 N.Y.U.L. REv. 527 (1940); Stem, The Conflict of Laws in
Commercial Arbitration, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 567 (1952); Comment, Com-
mercial Arbitration and the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 902 (1956).
25. Wilson v. Seligman, 144 U.S. 41 (1892); BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 81.1
1935); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 96 (1934); 21 C.J.S. Courts § 85(c).(1940).
26. The term "container" contract refers to the main agreement between the parties,
covering the subject matter of their transaction. One of the matters which may be
contained therein is a provision providing for the settlement by arbitration of all disputes
arising under the "container" contract.
27. Matter of Gantt (Hurtado & Cia), 297 N.Y. 433, 79 N.E.2d 815 (1948);
Gilbert v. Burnstine, 255 N.Y. 348, 174 N.E. 706 (1931); Matter of Zimmerman V.
Cohen, 236 N.Y. 15, 139 N.E. 764 (1923).
28. Prosperity Co. v. American Laundry Mach. Co., 67 N.Y.S.2d 669 (App.
Div.), aff'd without opinion, 297 N.Y. 486, 74 N.E.2d 188 (1947) (where arbitration
agreement provided for arbitration either under the laws of New York or Ohio, selection
of Ohio by the party who sought arbitration was held sufficient to constitute consent
to the jurisdiction of that state). See also Amazon Cotton Mills Co. v. Duplan Corp.,
245 N.C. 496, 96 S.E.2d 267 (1957) (suit by North Carolina seller seeking to enjoin
a New York buyer from arbitrating in New York as per agreement and to have all
matters pertaining to the controversy decided by the courts of North Carolina; held
for buyer, since he was the only party asserting a claim, he alone had the right where
to elect to bring suit).
29. See cases cited note 27 supra.
30. For further discussion of "incorporation by reference ' see text accompanying
notes 40-53 infra.
31. Where the agreement fails to specify the situs for arbitration but does incorporate
the arbitration rules of the American Arbitration Association, rule 10 gives the association
the authority to fix the situs.
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In giving effect to the intent of the parties, the courts tend to view
the problem in light of the general purpose sought to be achieved by
the provision for arbitration.3 2 The dominant theme which serves as a
backdrop to the determination of contractual intent is that parties who
choose to settle their controversies by arbitration are bound by this choice,
and a recalcitrant party will not be relieved of the contractual obligations
he has assumed.3 3
One of the key provisions of the New York Arbitration Act is
section 1450, which provides that:
The making of a contract . . . providing for arbitration in this
state, shall be deemed a consent of the parties thereto to the
jurisdiction of the supreme court of this state to enforce such
contract . . . and to enter judgment on an award thereon. A
party . . . may petition the supreme court . . . for an order
directing that such arbitration award proceed in the manner pro-
vided for in such contract. . . . Service thereof shall be made
in the manner specified in the contract . . . and if no manner
be specified therein, then in the manner provided by law for
personal service of a summons, within or without the state, or
substituted service of a summons, or upon satisfactory proof that
the party aggrieved has been or will be unable with due diligence
to make service in any of the foregoing manners, then such
notice as shall be served in such manner as the court or judge
may direct. (Emphasis added.) 3 4
10. Fixing of locality. . . . If the locality is not designated in the Contract
or Submission, or if within seven days from the date of filing the Demand
or Submission, the parties do not notify the Administrator of such desig-
nation, it shall have the power to determine the-locality and its decision
shall be final.
In Bradford Woolen Corp. v. Freedman, 189 Misc. 242, 71 N.Y.S.2d 257 (Sup. Ct.
1947), the association's selection of New York as the situs for arbitration was upheld
as a consent by the parties to the jurisdiction of the New York courts.
"New York is the situs of arbitration designated by many associations which handle
a considerable volume of disputes with rules similar to that of the American Arbitration
Association." (Emphasis added.) Weiss, The Arbitration Award and the Non-Resident:
Nuance in New York, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 366 n.4 (1948).
32. Arlington Towers Land Corp. v. John McShain, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 904 (D.D.C.
1957) (in determining the validity of an award the court must give effect to the intent
of the parties as evidenced by the agreement itself, which will be liberally construed to
that end); Amsterdam Dispatch, Inc. v. Devery, 4 N.Y.S.2d 908 (App. Div.), aff'd, 278
N.Y. 688, 16 N.E.2d 403 (1938). See also Matter of Wenger & Co. v. Propper Silk
Hosiery Mills, 239 N.Y. 199, 203, 146 N.E. 203, 204 (1924) ("When [parties] have
selected their tribunal, the courts ought not to interfere unless very substantial reasons
are shown").
33. See, e.g., Matter of Amtorg Trading Corp., 304 N.Y. 519, 109 N.E.2d 606
(1952) (motion to stay granted, party who agreed to arbitrate in Russia will not be
relieved of the contractual obligation it assumed); Gilbert v. Burnstine, 255 N.Y. 344,
174 N.E. 706 (1931); Republique Francaise v. American Foreign S.S. Corp., 129
N.Y.S.2d 330 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
34. FLA. SrAT. § 57.27(1) (1959), is the Florida counterpart of section 1450 of
the New York Civil Practice Act. It provides:
The making of an agreement or provision for arbitration subject to this
law and providing for arbitration in this state shall, whether made within
or outside this state, confer jurisdiction on the court to enforce the agree-
ment or provision under this law, to enter judgment . . . vacate, modify
or correct an award rendered thereunder . ...
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The legislative construction given to arbitration agreements by the
above provision has provided the New York courts with a guide which
removes any doubt that might previously have existed concerning their
acquisition of jurisdiction over defaulting nonresidents.35
The courts have encountered little difficulty in finding the consent
provision of section 1450 applicable when the agreement for arbitration
specifically designates New York as the situs for arbitration, 36 but in
the absence of such a designation, the results have not been consistent.' 7
In Bradford Woolen Corp. v. Freedman," the New York Supreme
Court held that under section 1450, a contract calling for arbitration in
New York39 was a consent to the jurisdiction of the New York Supreme
Court to enter judgment upon the award. In upholding the constitutionality
of the section, the court stated:
[T]he consent to arbitrate in New York was the establishment
of contact with this State and service of the papers by mail gave
sufficient notice to respondents, both at the arbitration proceedings
proper and on this application to bring forth objections from
them as to jurisdiction.40
In answer to the contentions that section 1450 was not within the
established limits for founding compulsory judicial jurisdiction upon the
performance of acts within the state, the New York Supreme Court was
of the opinion that:
Only in a limited sense, if, at all, can the jurisdiction conferred
by the section be said to be compulsory. Initially the jurisdiction
springs from the voluntary act of the nonresident himself who by
written contract has obligated himself to arbitrate a controversy
in this state. All section 1450 . . . does is to infuse this under-
taking with practical utility by making it enforcible in the courts
of the state where the arbitration itself is to be held. In so making
the local forum accessible to the parties the law merely fashions
a remedy which presumably they themselves would have chosen
to implement their agreement. When so understood, the deemed
consent to jurisdiction becomes a true and actual consent, rather
than one imposed by force of law.41
35. See Weiss, The Arbitration Award and the Non-Resident: Nuance in New
York, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 366 (1948), for a detailed analysis of those cases arising
prior to the 1944 amendment to section 1450.
36. See note 27 supra.
37. Compare Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 252 N.Y. 284, 169 N.E.
386 (1929), with Application of L. N. Jackson & Co., 106 N.Y.S.2d 725 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
38. 189 Misc. 242, 71 N.Y.S.2d 257 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
39. See Bradford Woolen Corp. v. Freedman, note 31 supra for the type of contract
used.
40. Bradford Woolen Corp. v. Freedman, 189 Misc. 242, 246, 71 N.Y.S.2d 257,
260 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
41. Application of Liberty Country Wear, 197 Misc. 581, 585, 96 N.Y.S.2d 134,
138 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
1960]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
B. The Making of an Agreement to Arbitrate
In the preceding section, there was little dispute as to the making
of an agreement to arbitrate. The main controversy, whether the parties
had consented to the jurisdiction of the rendering court by their contractual
expressions, presupposed the existence of an agreement to arbitrate. An
investigation into this most basic of issues, the making of an agreement
to arbitrate, is the subject of this section.
One of the most difficult objections to overcome, in an action to
enforce a default judgment, is the contention by the defendant that he
never entered into an agreement to arbitrate. In the absence of such an
agreement, all the legislative implementation in the world would be for
naught, insofar as giving vitality to the jurisdiction of the rendering court
is concerned.
The situations under which such a contention arises fall into three
basic factual categories. They are: (1) when the only reference to arbitration
is made in material incorporated by reference into the "container" agree-
ment; (2) when the defendant denies ever having entered into a "container"
contract with the plaintiff or denies ever having entered into an agreement
to arbitrate disputes arising thereunder; and finally, (3) when the defendant
admits entering into an agreement to arbitrate disputes arising under the
"container" contract, but denies the validity of the "container" contract
on grounds sufficient to void it, such as, that the acceptance was induced
by fraudulent misrepresentation.
1. INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE
The jurisdiction of a rendering court has proved highly vulnerable
when the "container" agreement omits the customary language expressing
an intent to settle all future disputes arising thereunder by arbitration. In
such situations, the court must find that it was the intent of the parties
to be bound by an arbitration provision contained in a set of rules which,
as a totality, were incorporated by reference into the main agreement.42
Unless such an intent can be found, the court lacks power to hear and
determine the cause.
In Samson v. Bergin,43 the defendant, in a suit brought in Connecticut
on a New York judgment, denied the existence of an agreement to arbitrate.
The precise issue presented was whether "the New York court had jurisdic-
tion to render judgment in personam against the defendant," 44 a resident of
Connecticut. The "container" contract, through an arbitration provision
in same, stipulated that all disputes other than those relating to quality
42. See WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 628 (Students' ed. 1938); RESTATEMENT, CON-
TRACTS § 230 (1932).
43. 138 Conn. 306, 84 A.2d 273 (1951).
44. Id. at 308-9, 84 A.2d at 274.
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of merchandise "shall be submitted to the American Arbitration Asso-
ciation." A dispute arose concerning a failure to make delivery, and
plaintiff demanded arbitration in New York under the rules of the
American Arbitration Association. Defendant ignored the notices, and
refused to partake in the hearings. The Supreme Court of Connecticut,
in denying full faith and credit to the New York judgment, held that
there were insufficient facts to support the inference that defendant even
had "constructive knowledge" of the arbitration rules of the American
Arbitration Association. In the absence of express consent, or an incorpora-
tion of those rules by reference, and the provision for arbitration being
silent on the situs of the arbitration, the court concluded that the defendant
could not be held to have agreed either to be bound by the rules of
the American Arbitration Association or to arbitrate in New York.
It has been held on the other hand that when the arbitration provision
does provide for arbitration under the rules and regulations of the American
Arbitration Association, "the fact that no copy of the rules and regulations
was furnished to the judgment debtor is immaterial." 45
The results of the Samson case are not so shocking when viewed in
light of the confused state of affairs that presently exists in New York
with regard to incorporation by reference. Three recent decisions of the
New York Court of Appeals form the basis for this confusion. 40 In Level
Export Corp. v. Wolz, Aiken 6 Co.,47 contracts for the purchase of
textiles were held to incorporate the arbitration clauses of a standard textile
sales note. The contracts provided that such note "is incorporated as a
part of this agreement and together herewith constitutes the entire contract
between buyer and seller."'48
In Riverdale Fabrics Corp. v. Tillinghast-Stiles Corp.,49 the "container"
contract contained a provision making it subject to the Cotton Yam
Rules of 1938, as amended. The court, going contrary to, but not overruling
its prior decision in Level Export, held that the clause in the sales contract
was not legally sufficient to incorporate by reference an arbitration provision
in the referred to Cotton Yarn Rules. In an approach similar to that
taken in the Samson case, the court stated that "the intent must be
clear to render arbitration the exclusive remedy; parties are not to be
led into arbitration unwittingly through subtlety." 50
45. American-British T.V. Movies, Inc. v. KOPR-TV, Cooper Broadcasting Co.,
144 N.Y.S.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
46. In re American Rail & Steel Co., 308 N.Y. 577, 127 N.E.2d 562 (1955);
Riverdale Fabrics Corp. v. Tillingbast-Stiles Corp., 306 N.Y. 288, 118 N.E.2d 104(1954); Level Export Corp. v. Wolz, Aiken & Co., 305 N.Y. 82, 111 N.E.2d 218 (1953).
47. 305 N.Y. 82, 111 N.E.2d 218 (1953).
48. Id. at 84, 111 N.E.2d at 219 (all italicized in original.)
49. 306 N.Y. 288, 118 N.E.2d 104 (1954); Annot., 41 A.L.R.2d 867 (1955).
50. Id. at 291, 118 N.E.2d at 106.
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In the most recent case, In re American Rail 6 Steel Co.,1 the
court was confronted with an incorporating clause very similar to the
one used in the Level Export case.52 It seemed clear that all of the
provisions of the incorporated form were intended to apply, including the
arbitration provision. Notwithstanding this similarity, and the court's finding
of incorporation in the Level Export case, it was held, on the authority
of Riverdale, that the arbitration provision was not validly incorporated
into the sales contract.
The decision in the American Rail 6 Steel case, although not over-
ruling the Level Export decision, 5 3 requires that extreme caution be
exercised in the use of an incorporating clause. Until the court resolves
this apparent conflict, the only safe solution, short of a formalistic
adherence to the clause used in Level Export, is to include all arbitration
provisions in the body of the "container" contract.5 4
The case of Wilson & Co. v. Fremont Cake 6 Meal Co.,5 5 decided in
1948, by a federal district court in Nebraska, is one of the few decisions
dealing with incorporation by reference to view contractually assumed
obligations as promises to be kept, and not compromised at the expense
of the future growth of arbitration. In an excellent review of most of the
arguments for and against incorporation, the court held that the proviso
"Rules: National Soybean Association" bound the parties to arbitrate
as provided in one of the association's rules. It is unfortunate that the
positive reasoning of the Wilson case has not been adopted by those
courts whose decisions chart the course of arbitration.
51. 308 N.Y. 577, 127 N.E.2d 562 (1955).
52. The container agreement provided that:
This contract is placed in accordance with the conditions of contract Form
ISM 826 Rev. Copy attached and can be modified or supplemented only
in writing and signed by both parties hereto. Id. at 579, 127 N.E.2d at 562.
Paragraph 25 of the aforementioned form, which was not attached, nor were its contents
brought to the seller's attention, provided that:
Arbitration: All questions and controversies arisina in connection with this
contract shall be submitted to arbitration in New York, N.Y., in accordance
with the rules of arbitration of the American Arbitration Association. Id.
at 579, 127 N.E.2d at 562.
53. The court's attempt to distinguish Level Export is rather weak. In both cases
the party denying the making of an agreement to arbitrate was not a member of the
association whose rules were incorporated, nor were the incorporated materials attached
to the container contract or seen by the parties in either case.
54. But see Wilson & Co. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co., 77 F. Supp. 364, 373
(D. Neb. 1948):
The plaintiff urges . . . that the parties to the present contract might
have manifested their agreement to arbitrate by a short and simple para-
graph in the memorandum explicitly declaring such a purpose, or by a
clause to the effect that, in adopting the association's rules, they intended
to adopt rule 115 dealing with arbitration. To this court, such a position
seems utterly untenable. If any of the rules were not to be operative their
omission ought, indeed, to have been expressly incorporated into the mem-
orandum by appropriate language. But having adopted by adequate descrip-
tive language the entire group of rules, the addition of such a phrase as,
'and we intend to include Rule 115,' would appear to be the ultimate
in supererogation.
55. 77 F. Supp. 364 (D. Neb. 1948).
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2. MAKING OF CONTRACT DENIED
A default judgment based on an ex parte arbitration award has
proved as vulnerable to a jurisdictional attack in the federal courts, under
the United States Arbitration Act, 56 as in state proceedings, when the
issue raised was the making of the agreement to arbitrate.
In Hanes Supply Co. v. Valley Evaporating Corp.5 7 a federal district
court in Oregon entered a default judgment against a nonresident, in
proceedings brought under the United States Arbitration Act 5 8 to confirm
an ex parte arbitration award. Defendant made no appearance, and service
was perfected by mail under section 9 of the Act which allows personal
service upon nonresidents in any district where they may be found.59
Jurisdiction was founded upon a written contract which defendant did
not sign, but allegedly assumed. The venue for a motion to confirm, in
the absence of a particular court being specified by the parties, is the
district within which the arbitral award was made. The situs of the
arbitration was to be whichever of the cities listed in the agreement
that was closest to the destination point. Notwithstanding the fact that
Cincinnati was the city closest to Atlanta, the plaintiff proceeded to
arbitration in Portland, Oregon where the award was rendered. Suit was
instituted on the judgment in Atlanta, the district where the defendant
resided.
The court of appeals for the Fifth Circuit, reversing a judgment for
plaintiff, held that the trial court erred in excluding, as a matter of law,
from its considerations the contentions of defendant that: no agreement
56. 9_U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1958).
57. 261 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1958).
58. The pertinent portions of sections 2 and 9 of the United States Arbitration Act
which enable a party to make application to a federal district court for confirmation of
an award are:
§ 2. Validity, irrevocability, and enforcement of agreements to arbitrate.
A written provision in any ...contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of
such contract or transaction ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforce-
able, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1958).
§ 9. Award of arbitrators; confirmation; jurisdiction; procedure. If the
parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court shall
be entered upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration, and shall
specify the court, then at any time within one year after the award is
made any party to the arbitration may apply to the court so specified for
an order confirming the award, and thereupon the court must grant such
an order unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected. . . . If no
court is specified in the agreement of the parties, then such application
may be made to the United States court in and for the district within
which such award was made. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1958).
59. 9 U.S.C § 9 (1958):
Notice of the application shall be served upon the adverse party, and there-
upon the court shall have jurisdiction of such party as though he had
appeared generally in the proceeding. . . .If the adverse party shall
be a nonresident, then the notice of the application shall be served by the
marshal of any district within which the adverse party may be found in
like manner as other process of the court.
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to arbitrate had ever been made by him; or if one had been made, it
was not to arbitrate at the place where arbitration was held; and, therefore,
the default judgment based on such purported arbitration was void for
want of proper venue. The court noted that to foreclose to defendant
"the right ever to challenge the existence of the peculiar circumstances
which alone gave the court [jurisdiction] . . . would be an extreme case
of 'lifting oneself by his own bootstraps.' "00
Despite the extreme facts of the Hanes case, where the defect in
venue was patent,01 it would seem to be the rule in the Fifth Circuit
that unless the defendant makes an appearance,62 or is personally served
in the state where the district court is located, in an action under the
United States Arbitration Act he can subsequently attack the court's
jurisdiction on either of the alternate grounds stated by the defendant
in the Hanes case. 3
Section 1458(2) of the New York Civil Practice Act provides a
means whereby the issue of the contract's making can be settled conclusively
at an early stage in the proceedings. The section states that:
A party who has not participated in the selection of the arbitrators
or in any of the proceedings had before them and who has not
made or been served with an application to compel arbitration
under section fourteen hundred fifty may also put in issue the
making of the contract or submission or the failure to comply
therewith, either by a motion for a stay of the arbitration or
in opposition to the confirmation of the award. If a notice shall
have been personally served upon such party of an intention to
conduct the arbitration pursuant to the provisions of a contract
or submission contract or submission specified in such notice, then
the issues specified in this subdivision may be raised only by
motion for a stay of the arbitration, notice of which motion must
be served within ten days after the service of the notice of intention
to arbitrate. Such notice must state in substance that unless within
60. Hanes Supply Co. v. Valley Evaporating Corp., 261 F.2d 29, 34 (5th Cir. 1958).
61. The patency of the error is of course dependent upon the court's interpretation
of the venue requirements of section 9, "the district within which such award was
made," would seem to indicate that the only thing significant is the ultimate fact that
an award was rendered within the district. Under such a construction, the requirements
of the agreement as to the situs would not appear to be controlling.
62. In a footnote the court observed that once an appearance is made in the render-
ing court, even a special appearance to contest jurisdiction, "the rule of res judicata
would apply." The rule laid down in Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Association,
282 U.S. 522, 525 (1931) "states the principle we apply here, where there was no
appearance; 'It had the election not to appear at all. If, in the absence of appearance,
the court had proceeded to judgment, and the present suit had been brought thereon,
respondent could have raised and tried out the issue in the present action, because it
would never have had its day in court with respect to jurisdiction.' " (Citations omitted.)
Hanes Supply Co. v. Valley Evaporating Corp., 261 F.2d 29, 34 n.7 (5th Cir. 1958).
63. The language of the opinion would seem to indicate that the making of the
agreement to arbitrate would still be in issue and open to inquiry even if the agreement
specified the rendering court as the one to enter judgment or in the absence of such
specification named as the situs for arbitration a place wherein the rendering court pre-
sided. Hanes Supply Co. v. Valley Evaporating Corp., 261 F.2d 29, 33 (5th Cir. 1958).
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ten days after its service, the party served therewith shall serve
a notice of motion to stay the arbitration, he shall thereafter be
barred from putting in issue the making of the contract or
submission or the failure to comply therewith. (Emphasis added.)
New York is the only state that thus far has enacted such a provision.
Research has failed to reveal a case involving an action on a sister state's
judgment when failure to answer a notice sent under section 1458(2)
was pleaded as barring an inquiry into the making of the "container"
contract or the agreement to arbitrate disputes arising thereunder.
The issue, however, has arisen in an intrastate context. In Schrafran
6 Finkel v. M. Lowenstein 6 Sons,64 the plaintiff brought a plenary
action in equity to restrain the entry of a judgment on an ex parte award
rendered against him. Plaintiff maintained that the award was a nullity
as he had not bought goods from defendant, had not agreed to any
submission to arbitration, and had not signed a contract to arbitrate.
The lower court granted defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground
that the letter sent by defendant to plaintiff notifying him of an intent
to arbitrate was sufficient to bar plaintiff's action under section 1458(2).
Plaintiff's failure to move for a stay of arbitration under section 1458(2),
in response to the notice, was held to bar him forever from setting aside
the award on the ground that there was no valid contract. The New
York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the notice was insufficient
to bind plaintiff. "The notice should state where and at what time the
party is to proceed and the consequences of his failure to act as the law
specifies." 6 5 The court seriously doubted how a party who made no
contract could be "bound by an award of arbitrators who had no jurisdic-
tion."66 However, the court begrudgingly seemed to admit that a notice
fulfilling the above requirements would constitute due process of law.
It seems that in the modern scheme of things, disputes and suits
arising therefrom are an unavoidable by-product of economic commercial
endeavor. Under such circumstances, it may be contended that businessmen
have an affirmative duty to bring their differences to as expeditious a
conclusion as is possible. Simply stated, this means that there are some
notices which should not be permitted to go unnoticed without dire conse-
[Alppellant denied the existence of any written contract binding on it
agreeing to an arbitration and, a fortiori, the existence of any contract
which specified Portland as the place for any arbitration, or the district
court of the district of Oregon as the court which could enter final judg-
ment as contemplated in Section 9; that without the existence of such an
agreement the provisions of that section for service on a non-resident never
became applicable, and since the defect in service under the usual venue
and service requirements were not waived by a voluntary appearance, the
Oregon district court never obtained jurisdiction over the person of appellant
in order to make a binding determination on the existence of the agreement
to arbitrate. (Emphasis added.)
64. 280 N.Y. 164, 19 N.E.2d 1005 (1939).
65. Id. at 172, 19 N.E.2d at 1008.
66. Id. at 171, 19 N.E.2d at 1007.
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quences attaching. This is the result that section 1458(2) seeks to
accomplish. Whether this duty should extend to situations like Schafran,
where they deny ever having entered into a legal relationship, is highly
debatable.
How sister state courts will react to section 1458(2) is unknown.
If the reaction of the court in Schafran is any indication, it will not be
a favorable one. The failure of the New York legislature to provide for
a uniform type notice is an oversight which many courts will undoubtedly
seize upon, as did the court in Schafran, to hold the notice insufficient.
A similar result could be achieved by narrowly construing section 1458(2)
as barring only the question of whether the defendant entered into an
agreement to arbitrate in New York. Such a construction would leave
the issue of the making of the "container" contract open to inquiry in
the subsequent action.
3. CONTRACT INDUCED BY MISREPRESENTATION
An action was brought in a Tennessee federal district court on a
New York default judgment confirming an ex parte arbitration award.67
Defendant made no appearance in the New York proceedings, and for
the first time contended that there was no contract to arbitrate between
the parties, in that defendant was induced to sign the contract by the
alleged misrepresentations of the plaintiff.
In granting full faith and credit to the judgment, the court held
that those contentions should have been raised in the New York court
"and the defendant having failed to make them there cannot make them
here, for the reason that . . . under section 1458 [part one], defendant
was given an opportunity to attack the contract and, having failed to do
so, is now foreclosed from raising the question."6 The defendant made
the further objection that since he made no appearance in response to
plaintiff's notice, plaintiff's failure to move for an order to proceed prior
to instituting proceedings was fatal. The court quickly disposed of this
objection holding that such a motion was unnecessary under the authority
of section 1458.69
The finality of the rendering court's determination of its jurisdiction
as being conclusive of whether an agreement to arbitrate had been made
is a jurisdictional issue which has threaded its way through much of the
discussion in this section. The decision in the above case is particularly
67. Hirsch Fabrics Corp. v. Southern Athletic Co., 98 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Tenn.
1951).
68. Id. at 439.
69. The pertinent provisions of section 1458 of the New York Civil Practice Act
provide: "An award shall be valid and enforceable according to its terms and under
the provisions of this article, without previous adjudication of the existence of a sub-
mission or contract to arbitrate .. "
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significant in that the court refused to inquire into the making of the
agreement, viewing the New York proceeding as being conclusively
determinative of that issue. The case is factually distinguishable from a
Schafran type situation in several major respects. First, the defendant
admitted entering into a contract with plaintiff which called for arbitration
and consent to the jurisdiction of the New York courts;70 secondly, defendant
received notices of all proceedings, and had ample opportunity to object
until judgment was entered; and finally, plaintiff did not attempt to limit
defendant's right of objection by sending him a notice of intention to
arbitrate as provided for in section 1458(2) of the New York Arbitration
Act.7 1
The result, viewed in the light of the facts which gave rise to it,
would appear to be a desirous one. It places a reasonable duty on the
defendant to protect his interests. No longer can a party who has admitted
entering into a legal relationship with another, stand idly by while an
attempt is being made to resolve a dispute by the methods prescribed in
their agreement. It would seem that such a result might conceivably be
extended to the incorporation by reference cases. The case of Samson
v. Bergin72 renders little assistance since the court did not consider the
issue of finality, although, by implication, its failure to consider the matter
may be viewed as a denial of its applicability. However, the view taken
by New York in the American Rail 6 Steel73 case seems presently to
preclude such an extension.
C. Other Jurisdictional Grounds
If the contract between the parties be construed as evidencing an
intent to consent to the jurisdiction of a particular forum, it is vital to
note further whether provisions in the contract and the requirements of
due process make implicit in such an intent the fulfillment of other
conditions precedent. These prerequisites, which must be met before consent
can become an established fact, are comprised of such jurisdictional facts
of life as: notice; service of process; and capacity to institute proceedings.
The list is not complete, but it is illustrative of the complications that can
70. The contract between the parties provided that: "Buyer and seller consent to
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the State of New York and further consent
that any process or notice of motion or any application to the court, including for appli-
cation for judgment upon an award, may be served outside the State of New York by
registered mail or by personal service, provided a reasonable time for appearance is
allowed." (Emphasis added.) Hirsch Fabrics Corp. v. Southern Athletic Co., 98 F.
Supp. 436, 438 (E.D. Tenn. 1951).
71. Cf. Lipman v. Haeuser Shellac Co., 289 N.Y. 76, 43 N.E.2d 817 (1942)
(once the making of a valid contract or submission and the failure to comply therewith
are admitted, a claim that the contract has been cancelled or terminated by the act of
one or both of the parties will have no effect on the validity of the award and the
judgment rendered thereon).
72. 138 Conn. 306, 84 A.2d 273 (1951).
73. 308 N.Y. 577, 127 N.E.2d 562 (1955).
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arise and forever remain to haunt a subsequently rendered judgment. This
is particularly true when one of the parties attacking the judgment is a
non-resident who never appeared in the proceedings which gave rise to
the judgment.
1. NOTICE
The fact that a party fails to partake in arbitration after he has
consented to jurisdiction and received notice was recognized in the
leading case of Gilbert v. Burnstine 4 as having no effect on the validity
of the award rendered. But, even though one consents to jurisdiction, such
consent, nevertheless, generally contemplates process in the form of notice.7 5
The "means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing
the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it."6
In most "container" contracts, the arbitration rules which are incor-
porated by reference into the arbitration provision provide for out-of-state
service by registered mail." This manner of service has been upheld as
a means provided for by the parties in their contract, and was sufficient
to confer jurisdiction on the rendering court.78 However, it has been
held that the notice must be actually received, and that informal knowledge
is not sufficient.79
2. CAPACITY OF AGENT
A jurisdictional defect which rarely has received the attention of the
courts is the legal capacity of an agent who institutes arbitration proceedings
in his own name without joining his principal.8 0 The two cases that have
considered the question held that an agent can institute arbitration
74. 255 N.Y. 348, 174 N.E. 706 (1931).
75. Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
76. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950).
77. E.g., by incorporating the rules of the Amercan Arbitration Association into
their arbitration provision, each party "shall be deemed to have consented and shall
consent that any papers, notices or process necessary or proper for the initiation or
continuation of an arbitration under these rules and for any court action in connection
therewith or for the entry of judgment or any award made thereunder may be served
upon such party (a) by mail addressed to such party or his attorney at his last known
address ...provided that reasonable opportunity to be heard with regard thereto has
been granted such party." Rule 39, Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American
Arbitration Association.
78. Ripley Fabrics Corp. v. Hymen, 91 F. Supp. 1007 (N.D. I11. 1950) (arbitration
rules of the National Federation of Textiles); Battle v. General Cellulose Co., 23 N.J.
538, 129 A.2d 865 (1957) (rules of the American Arbitration Association); Merger
Fabrics, Inc. v. Coill-Shuman Co., 74 N.Y.S.2d 76 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (rules of the Ameri-
can Arbitration Association).
79. Republique Francaise v. Cellosilk Mfg. Co., 309 N.Y. 269, 128 N.E.2d 750
(1955), Note, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 955 (1956). But see Stafford Int'l Corp. v. Hartman
Hosiery Co., 89 N.Y.S.2d 172, 173 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (party who inexplicably refused
six registered letters of notice was held to have been "afforded every reasonable oppor-
tunity of participation in the arbitration. . . . [Ilts default was not unintentional, and
in the interests of justice it is not entitled to put the petitioner to the time, expense
and burden of a repeat arbitration proceeding.")
80. "In every suit there must be a legal entity [knowni as the real plaintiff, either
a natural or artificial person, or a quasi-artificial person, such as a partnership; and where
a suit is brought in a name which is neither, it is a nullity .. " Board of Road &
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proceedings if he is vested with sufficient authority."' What determines
the sufficiency of the agent's authority is a question of fact.8 2 In Watts v.
PhillipfJones Corp.,s3 the New York Supreme Court held that the plaintiff
was more than a mere agent because the contract was made in his own
name, and all the dealings were to be made through him. Therefore,
under the circumstances, he came within one of the exceptions of the
New York Code of Civil Procedure 4 which permitted him to bring
suit. Application of Eimco Corp."5 followed the principle of Watts, in
that an agent authorized to conduct arbitration proceedings on behalf
of his principal could not, as a matter of law, be said to be an improper
party, but held that a hearing was necessary for it to determine whether
the agent had sufficient authority.
Under section 210 of the New York Civil Practice Act, a "trustee
of an express trust" has been construed to include a person with whom
or in whose name a contract is made for the benefit of another, and
such party may sue without -joining the person for whose benefit the
action is prosecuted. 6 This interpretation has been upheld even though
the plaintiff is not the real party in interest.8 7 The meaning of the
exceptions, created under the various codes, to the real party in interest
requirement is in a muddled state at best,88 especially with regard to
agents being the proper parties to institute arbitration.
In a recent unreported Florida case,s9 plaintiff-agent, who contracted
in his own name for disclosed principals, instituted arbitration proceedings
Revenue Comm'rs of Candler County v. Collins, 94 Ga. App. 562, 95 S.E.2d 758,
759 (1956). See also Bartlet v. Knight, 1 Mass. 401 (1805) (denying full faith and
credit only because of incapacity, in accordance with the "principles as well as natural
justice as of the common law.")
81. Application of Eimco Corp., 163 N.Y.S.2d 273 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Watts v.
Phillip-Jones Corp., 207 N.Y. Supp. 493 (App. Div. 1925). See also Considerant v.
Brisbane, 22 N.Y. 389 (1860) (the leading New York case on the issue of agents as
real parties in interest, holding that a contract is with an agent and in his name, although
he is described as an agent on its face, when it is negotiated with him, and is by its
terms to be performed by or to him); Albany & Rensselaer Co. v. Lindberg, 121 U.S.
451 (1887) (construed section 449 of the N.Y. Code of Civil Procedure as allowing
an agent who makes a contract for his principal to bring suit).
82. Ibid.
83. 207 N.Y. Supp. 493 (App. Div. 1925).
84. New York Code of Civil Procedure § 499 provided that a trustee of an express
trust may sue without joining with him the person for whose benefit the action is
prosecuted, and defines a trustee of an express trust as a person with whom or in whose
name a contract is made for the benefit of another. Section 449 may presently be found
in substantially the same form in section 210 of the New York Civil Practice Act.
85. 163 N.Y.S.2d 273 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
86. See note 83 supra.
87. Newmark v. National Bank & Trust Co. of Norwich, 147 N.Y.S.2d 565 (Sup.
Ct. 1955).
88. See Atkinson, The Real Party in Interest Rule: A Plea for its Abolition, 32
N.Y.U.L. REV. 926 (1957); Clark & Hutchins, The Real Party in Interest, 34 YALE L.J.
259 (1925); Simes, The Real Party in Interest, 10 Ky. L.J. 60 (1922). For a
compilation of the code states having statutes similar to New York's see CLARK, CODE
PLEADING 158 n.17 (1947). Rule 1.17 of the FLA. R. Civ. P. and Rule 17 of the
FED. R. Civ. P. are basically the same.
89. Motion Pictures for Television, Inc. v. Gulfport Broadcasting Co., B-124, Court
of Record, Escambia County, Fla., Dec. 19, 1958 (unreported case).
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in New York against defendant for breach of contract. Defendant failed
to appear or answer any of the notices received by him regarding the
arbitration, the award for plaintiff, or the judgment entered thereon. In
a suit upon the New York judgment, it was held void for lack of jurisdiction
and not entitled to full faith and credit since, as a matter of law, the
agent was not the real party in interest and lacked legal capacity, the
principals being the only ones with whom the defendant had consented
to arbitrate.
The uncertainty of the New York law in this area, the factual nature
of the issue involved, and the prima facie case made out by the plaintiff
which overcame defendant's initial objections, and which defendant further
failed to rebut, make highly suspect the court's granting of summary
judgment for defendant, sua sponte.90 There is no question that the
public policy of the State of Florida, as embodied in the recently enacted
Florida Arbitration Code, is clearly in favor of the enforcement of foreign
arbitration awards."' In view of this policy, any issues regarding the
"competency" of the rendering court should not be colored by the fact
that arbitration by consent is involved.92 Unfortunately, the above case
would appear to exude latent overtones of just such an involvement as
evidenced by the court's preliminary statement that:
The defendant did not participate in the arbitration proceeding
in New York; it was not served with process of the State of
New York, and did not participate in the judicial proceedings
in the Court that entered up the judgment here sought to
be enforced. 3
The deleterious effect that the overtones of the above case might
have on the progress of commercial arbitration in Florida is deserving
of serious consideration by our courts. Undoubtedly the court could have,
consonant with full faith and credit and clue process of law, come to the
conclusion that under the evidence adduced, the plaintiff had the legal
capacity to invoke jurisdiction by bringing arbitration.
Another approach would be to characterize capacity as a "non-
jurisdictional fact" as has been done in several eases involving foreign
90. "[A]nybody opposing recognition of an extrastate judgment because of lack
of local jurisdiction of the rendering court, must in general, bear the burden of proof
since a sister state judgment is presumed to be valid. Where he [the defendant] has
established, however, some fact which ordinarily negatives jurisdiction, it is incumbent
upon his opponent to prove the validity of the judgment under the law of the judgment
court." EIIRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 211 (1959). See also Markham v. Nisbet,
60 So.2d 393 (Fla. 1952) (confession judgment); Stern, Florida Conflict of Laws, 8
MIAMI L.Q. 209, 236 (1954).
91. See FLA. STAT. § 57.27(2) (1959).
92. Gilbert v. Burnstine, 255 N.Y. 348, 174 N.E. 706 (1931).
93. Motion Pictures for Television, Inc. v. Gulfport Broadcasting Co., B-124, Court
of Record, Escambia County, Fla., Dec. 19, 1958 (unreported ease).
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administrators. 94 The capacity of an agent loses some of its "fundamental
,nature" when it is considered that the only real objection of defendant
is that the principals are not bound by the outcome of the award, and
the defendant could therefore once again be subjected to suit.95 This
objection would lose all validity however, if, even in the absence of
express authority, the principals were found to have ratified arbitration
by the agent either prior to, during, or after the arbitration award. 96
3. CAPACITY OF FOREIGN UNLICENSED CORPORATION
A foreign corporation, which :neither does business nor is licensed
to do business in New York, is prevented by statute from bringing an
action in New York on a contract executed there. 97 This disability, it has
been contended, should also prevent a foreign corporation from enforcing
an agreement to arbitrate in New York.98 However, the New York Court
of Appeals refuted this contention when it refused to stay an arbitration
begun by an unlicensed foreign corporation, concluding that arbitration was
a special proceeding to which the statutory prohibition was inapplicable. 99
III. CONCLUSION
"Arbitration has been heralded as a ready and speedy relief from
the intricacies of the law."100 Why then should these objectives be
compromised when it becomes necessary to seek the enforcement of an
award confirming judgment in a sister state action? Too many courts
have thwarted the concept of "ready and speedy relief" by narrowly
construing contractual intent and by permitting expensive relitigation of
many issues that should have been settled conclusively in the rendering
forum.
The courts must realize that "these business contracts are not drawn
with the precision of deeds or judgments." 101 They must be read "with
94. In Wikoff v. Hirschell, 258 N.Y. 28, 179 N.E. 249 (1932), Chief Judge
Cardozo was confronted with a situation somewhat analogous to the problems presented
by the Gulfport case, supra note 93. Defendant on appeal contended for the first time
that the foreign administratrix lacked the capacity to bring suit. Held, that even though
the cases are in conflict as to whether a foreign administrator has capacity, an objection
which is not seasonably made is waived.
95. See e.g., Canfield v. Scripps, 15 Cal. App.2d 642, 59 P.2d 1040, cert. denied,
300 U.S. 658 (1936); EIIRENZWEIC, CONFLICT OF LAWS 51 (1959).
96. See STURCES, COMMERCIAL AR1I1TRATION AND AWARDS §§ 49-54 (1930).
97. N.Y. GENERAL CORP. LAW § 218.
98. In re Vanguard Films, Inc., 188 Misc. 796, 67 N.Y.S.2d 893 (SLIp. Ct. 1947);
In re Levys, 73 N.Y.S.2d 801, aff'd, 94 N.Y.S.2d 924 (App. Div. 1950) (held that
the statute precluded a foreign corporation from successfully resisting a motion to stay
arbitration in New York, even though at the time it made the motion authorization to
do business had been obtained).
99. Tugee Laces, Inc. v. Mary Muffet, Inc., 297 N.Y. 914, 79 N.E.2d 744 (1948).
100. Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 252 N.Y. 284, 307, 169 N.E. 386, 394
(1929) (Crane, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 306, 169 N.E. at 394.
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the liberality of meaning which attaches to the laconism of business
men." 10 2 However, the courts are not the only ones to blame, although
their conservative approach has contributed greatly.
A party seeking arbitration must evidence his good faith by adhering
to the statutory procedures. His attorney should have enough foresight
to realize that eventually he will be involved in a sister state action,
and govern himself accordingly. It is hoped that the jurisdictional defects
which have been reviewed in this article will indicate the necessary steps
that must be taken for businessmen who seek to employ arbitration as an
effective means for settling disputes with non-residents.
102. Ibid.
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